The Antitrust Attorney Blog

“It’s Complicated”: A Review of Barry Hawk’s Monopoly in America

March 2, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Most antitrust practitioners, even members of the general public, have a good intuitive sense of what Sherman Act Section 1 is aimed at. Whether you follow the common law’s ancient voiding of “combinations in restraint of trade,” as does Greg Werden for example, or your kindergarten teacher’s instruction to avoid “ganging up,” as explained by Dick Steuer, even beginning antitrust students understand that certain agreements are bad for competition and, so, should be illegal.

But what about Sherman Act Section 2’s prohibition of monopolization? Is there anything in America’s history that might illuminate what legislators were thinking in 1890 or how courts should approach the issue today?

Those are the questions tackled by long-time practitioner and academic Barry Hawk in his 2022 book Monopoly in America. In just under 200 pages, Hawk covers over 400 years of American usage of “monopoly” to find, well, it’s complicated. Americans have hated monopolies for centuries, except for the ones that at least some of them liked, and their understanding of the term has varied over the years. Hawk succinctly explains the twists and turns and draws helpful lessons for today’s practitioners and policymakers.

Anti-Monopoly Tradition? Yes, but…

Hawk divides his survey into chapters covering four distinct American periods: colonial era; Revolution and founding; antebellum; and modern, that is, post-Civil War. In each chapter, Hawk walks through the laws, court opinions, and public statements of the period to illustrate America’s thinking about monopolies at that time. Like other authors, Hawk finds that America does have an anti-monopoly tradition; however, Hawk’s survey shows that that tradition does not take a consistent, linear path. Below, I summarize some of the inconsistencies highlighted by Hawk.

Yes, Americans were against monopolies but what they mean by the term “monopoly” has changed over the centuries. In colonial and early America, “engrossing” and “forestalling” were two of the major concerns captured by the “monopoly” term. Engrossing is roughly “cornering the market,” buying up all the goods so as to increase prices or otherwise control distribution. Forestalling is usually defined as buying goods from the producer or importer before the goods arrived at the designated public market. Concern about both issues waned after the Civil War, especially as American markets grew and demonized forestallers gradually became helpful facilitators or middlemen.

Similarly, pre-Civil War monopoly concerns included government grants of exclusivity to particular private actors. Famous examples include the British East India Company and the Second Bank of the United States. Again, concerns about these “monopolists” faded after the Civil War as worries about large private companies that we now know as “monopolists” grew.

Yes, Americans and their English predecessors were against “monopolies” but sometimes a monopoly was in the eye of the beholder. As Hawk describes, the English principle outlawed monopolies but made exceptions for local grants of exclusive privileges. Sometimes, laws and public opinion only condemned monopolies that served no public purpose, which was determined under a shifting reasonableness standard. In Colonial times, laws and constitutions sometimes made exceptions for local exclusive licenses, patents, and copyrights. Engrossing was a monopoly when it was “hoarding” but not when it was merely “storage,” and the dividing line was far from clear. Now, antitrust law allows state “monopolies” if expressly granted by the legislature and actively supervised. So, Americans definitely have been against monopolies except when they have been for them.

Yes, Americans are against monopolies, but the strength of that opposition has varied over time. Hawk focuses on the cycles since the 1890 Sherman Act: success in the early period with breakups in Northern Securities and Standard Oil; hibernation in the Roaring “20’s and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term; then more successes, like Alcoa and AT&T, into the “70’s; followed by more hibernation, with a Microsoft exception, until the 2020 election. So, while the anti-monopoly orientation never goes away, sometimes it remains dormant for quite some time.

Why the Cyclicality?

While Hawk’s fact reporting is interesting, the book probably is at its best when this long-time antitrust guru then offers up his explanation for why some of those facts occurred. At the end of the book, Hawk discusses some factors that he thinks best explain the cycles of monopoly challenges since 1890: political support; popular demand for action; changes in facts and economic conditions; changes in economic theory; legal process concerns; and the predominance of the consumer welfare standard. I will comment on three of them.

Interestingly, Hawk found that “popular support less clearly correlates with aggressive enforcement” than do some of the other elements. He sees no large anti-monopoly groundswell post World War II to accompany aggressive Section 2 enforcement. Today, despite the anti-monopoly push, “the general population appears happy to get ‘free’ platforms and relatively low-cost apps.” I would add the anecdote that at least one ranking of the most admired companies in 2022 was headed by Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft, three companies often accused of being monopolists. As Hawk puts it, popular support is helpful but not necessary to generate aggressive enforcement by the “politicians, academics, and antitrust industry generally.” As another long-time antitrust practitioner described it more than fifteen years ago, it is the true believers in the antitrust religion who often drive enforcement trends.

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DOJ Announces New Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program Applicable to All Corporate Crimes

February 23, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Jon Cieslak and Molly Donovan

For the first time, there is a nationwide Voluntary Self-Disclosure Program applicable to any corporate misconduct prosecutable by a US Attorney. As detailed below, companies that make a qualifying Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) are eligible for “resolutions under more favorable terms than if the government had learned of the misconduct through other means” – in other words, a criminal guilty plea could be avoided in exchange for a VSD.

To qualify as a VSD, the disclosure must be:

Voluntary. There must not be a pre-existing obligation to disclose pursuant to regulation, contract or prior DOJ resolution (e.g., a non-prosecution agreement).

Prompt. The disclosure must be prior to an “imminent threat” of disclosure or investigation; prior to the misconduct being public or otherwise known to the government; within a “reasonably prompt time” after the company becomes aware of the misconduct.

Substantive. The disclosure must include “all relevant facts” known to the company at the time of the disclosure, even if the internal investigation is in a preliminary stage. As new facts become known, they should be reported as the investigation unfolds.

In exchange for a VSD, the Department will not seek a guilty plea so long as:

The company “fully cooperated” with the DOJ. The terms of cooperation, including how long and to what degree cooperation is required, are not specified.

The company “timely and appropriately remediated” the conduct. Remediation includes the payment of “all restitution” to victims.

There are no aggravating factors, i.e., the conduct did not present a grave threat to national health or safety; the conduct was not “deeply pervasive” throughout the company and did not involve “current executive management.” Whether the knowledge of a corporate executive constitutes their “involvement” is not specified.

In the event of an aggravating factor, a guilty plea is not required automatically, but the DOJ will “assess the relevant facts” to determine an “appropriate resolution” on a case-by-case basis.

In the end, where the VSD is deemed satisfactory, the criminal resolution “could include a declination, non-prosecution agreement, or deferred prosecution” in lieu of a guilty plea. In the event the Department does choose to impose a criminal penalty, it “will not impose a criminal penalty that is greater than 50% below the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range.”

Finally, if, by the time of the resolution, the company has implemented an “effective compliance program,” the Department will not require the imposition of a monitor. These decisions are to be made on a case-by-case basis in the USAO’s sole discretion.

As a concept and seemingly in practice, the Program shares many similarities with the DOJ Antitrust Division Leniency Policy and Procedures, under which antitrust lawyers have been operating for years, perfecting the art of timely self-disclosure and appropriate cooperation with the Department for companies that choose to self-disclose antitrust felonies. As a result, we as antitrust practitioners could bring unique experience to companies weighing the costs and benefits of participating in the new VSD Program for non-antitrust crimes and, if companies do self-disclose, how to participate and advocate within the Program effectively.

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Domestic Companies and Their Execs Plead Guilty to Criminal Price-Fixing

February 16, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Jon Cieslak & Molly Donovan

Two individuals and four of their corporate entities pleaded guilty to an antitrust conspiracy to fix the prices of DVDs and Blu-Rays sold on Amazon’s platform during the 2016-2019 time period.

According to the plea agreements, the defendants “engaged in discussions, transmitted across state lines both orally and electronically, with representatives of other sellers of DVDs and Blu-Ray Discs on the Amazon Marketplace. During these discussions, the defendant[s] reached agreements to suppress and eliminate competition for the sale of DVDs and Blue-Ray Discs . . . by fixing prices” paid by consumers throughout the United States. Further details about the operation of the conspiracy are not public.

The total affected commerce done by the six guilty-plea defendants is $2.875 million. The agreed-to fines imposed against the corporate defendants range from $68,000 to $234,000, some payable in installments. Sentencing for the individuals is forthcoming with the plea agreements specifying that the Department of Justice is free to argue for a period of incarceration to be served by each of the individuals at issue.

The action is pending in the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. It serves as a reminder that the DOJ’s Antitrust Division will not excuse price-fixing by relatively small companies, even if the volume of affected commerce is also relatively small.

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Meta/Within Merger Antitrust Opinion: Cutting Edge Tech, Vintage Precedent

February 14, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Authors: Steven Cernak and Luis Blanquez

Earlier in February 2023, the Court for the Northern District of California denied the FTC’s preliminary injunction motion to prevent the closing of Meta Platforms Inc.’s acquisition of Within Unlimited, Inc.––a virtual reality (VR) App developer. The FTC has declined to appeal the loss and has paused its administrative in-house challenge. Meta has now closed the transaction. Below we summarize the key points from the opinion and what we think are the two key takeaways for merger practitioners.

Opinion Summary

As with many contested mergers, a key legal battle in this case was market definition. The FTC proposed a relevant product market consisting of VR dedicated fitness apps, meaning VR apps “designed so users can exercise through a structured physical workout in a virtual setting.” The merging parties, on the other hand, alleged that the FTC’s proposed market definition was too narrow, excluding “scores of products, services, and apps” that are “reasonably interchangeable” with VR dedicated fitness apps, including VR apps categorized as “fitness” apps on Meta’s VR platform, fitness apps on gaming consoles and other VR platforms, and non-VR connected fitness products and services”. Extensively quoting Brown Show and that venerable opinion’s “practical indicia” of a market, the Court held that the FTC made a sufficient evidentiary showing of a well-defined submarket, consisting of VR dedicated fitness apps.

Having won that battle, the FTC argued that the proposed acquisition would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition in the market for VR dedicated fitness apps. According to the agency, even though Meta was not currently a competitor in the VR dedicated fitness app market, it was both (i) an actual potential competitor, and (ii) a perceived potential competitor in the relevant market. In the first theory, the FTC argued that the transaction harmed competition because Meta would have entered the market on its own. In the second theory, the FTC argued that Meta’s mere presence on the wings of the market before the transaction kept current participants from acting anticompetitively.

The court denied the FTC’s motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the facts did not support either potential competition theory. The court, however, did find that both theories remained good law and, therefore, are available for the FTC and DOJ to support violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in the future. Merger practitioners will need to learn, or remember, the necessary elements of these theories, including sufficient market concentration and the acquiring party having the necessary characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to enter the market.

Key Takeaway: Old Precedent Comes Back

Most merger practitioners have become used to working with the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) and the opinions that follow their reasoning, especially those from this century. For some practitioners with little to no grey hair, those precedents might be all they have ever known. For example, the district court opinion in AT&T/TimeWarner in 2018 has multiple cites to H.J. Heinz from 2001, Arch Coal from 2004, and Baker Hughes from 1990. Last year’s UnitedHealth/Change opinion cited all those same cases plus Anthem from 2017 and Sysco from 2015. Sure, some older precedent always makes it into opinions and briefs — defendants often cite General Dynamics from 1974 and the government loves 1963’s Philadelphia National Bank — but those exceptions are few.

As the FTC has moved away from the 2010 HMGs but not yet replaced them, practitioners have questioned where to find guidance. If the briefs and opinion in this case are any clue, the answer might be court opinions from forty or more years ago.

For example, look at the cases cited in the potential competition sections of the opinion. Now, it is true that the Supreme Court cases that extensively discuss the theories, such as Marine Bancorp., date from the 1970’s. The district and appellate court cases relied on by the court in the section discussing the continued validity of the actual potential competition theory date from 1984, 1981, 1980, and 1974. The only more recent court opinion mentioned is the FTC’s loss in 2015’s Steris. The Court’s 1973 opinions in Falstaff Brewing gets extensive discussion in ten separate mentions. According to Lexis, that case involving Dizzy Dean’s favorite beer has only been cited twenty times since 2010.

Even when defining the product market, the court spends ten pages going through various indicia found in 1962’s Brown Shoe and only two pages on the hypothetical monopolist test found in the HMGs — and then only “[i]n the interests of thoroughness.” The cases cited in the Court’s legal analysis of product market definition include several from this century but also older ones like Twin City Sports Service (1982), Times Picayune (1953), and Continental Can (1964). So at least until any new Guidelines are issued, merger practitioners might need to spend more time honing arguments based on older cases and less time arguing the intricacies of the HMGs.

Key Takeaway: Competitive Pressure from Apple?

In discussing competition in the VR hardware and various software or app “markets,” the Court describes many different current competitors. While it is difficult to know for certain because of the extensive redactions, it appears that Apple applied extensive competitive pressure on Meta, either as another potential suitor for Within or a current or potential competitor in some VR-related market—or both. Specifically, the judge says in his opinion that Meta was concerned that Apple might “lock in” fitness content (perhaps Within?) that would be exclusive to Apple’s expected VR hardware.

If so, these two Big Tech behemoths pressuring each other, especially in markets neither one dominates, is further support for some of the ideas expressed at least in Nicolas Petit’s Moligopoly Scenario. Paraphrasing one of Petit’s points, these powerful companies might seem like monopolists, but they act more like oligopolists fearful of competitive pressure from other giants and others. In short, none of them wants to miss the next big thing and become the next Blockbuster to some future Netflix. This opinion seems to put considerable weight on contemporaneous documents from Meta and others that describe those types of strategic considerations driving Meta’s behavior. If future cases follow suit, merger practitioners might be able to focus more on well-supported boardroom considerations and less on hypothetical analyses from outside economic experts.

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What are the Available Exemptions to Antitrust Liability?

February 10, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

Congress and the federal courts have—over time—created several exemptions or immunities to antitrust liability.

The US Supreme Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States explained that “The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.” 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). And “[t]he heart of our national economy long has been faith in the value of competition.” Id.

National Society of Professional Engineers holds, effectively, that those that think that they should not be subject to competition—for whatever reason—don’t get a free pass.

But there are several situations that do create limited exemptions to federal antitrust liability. Importantly, however, the US Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that courts should narrowly interpret these exemptions.

Here are the primary antitrust exemptions created by Congress and the federal courts:

State-Action Immunity. State-action immunity has come up a lot at Bona law. This exemption allows certain state and local government activity to avoid antitrust scrutiny. Lately, the US Supreme Court has narrowed the doctrine, including for state licensing boards that seek its protection when sued under the antitrust laws (North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission). Bona Law also advocates a market-participant exception to state-action immunity, but the courts are split on that issue. We expect that this exemption will continue to narrow over time.

Filed-Rate Doctrine. The filed-rate doctrine is a defense to an antitrust action that is premised on the regulatory rates filed with a federal administrative agency. In many regulated industries (like insurance, energy, shipping, etc.), businesses must, generally, file the rates that they offer to customers with federal agencies. The filed-rate doctrine eliminates antitrust liability for instances in which, to satisfy the antitrust elements, a judge or judge must question or second guess the level of these filed rates (i.e. that they included overcharges resulting from anticompetitive conduct). So a business filing rates with a regulator is not, by itself, sufficient to create an exemption from antitrust liability. There are nuances.

Business of Insurance. The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts certain acts that are the business of insurance and regulated by one or more states from antitrust scrutiny. You can read more about the McCarran-Ferguson Act and its requirements here.

Baseball. That’s right—there is a baseball exemption to antitrust liability. This is a judge-made doctrine developed long ago. The other sports don’t have an antitrust exemption and the question of whether baseball should have one comes up periodically. If you want to learn more, you should read the five-part series on baseball and antitrust that Luke Hasskamp authored.

Agricultural Cooperatives. The Capper-Volstead Act provides a limited antitrust exemption to farm cooperatives. Under certain circumstances, this Congressional Act allows farmers to pool their output together and increase their bargaining power against buyers of agricultural products. You can read more about this in Aaron Gott’s article on the Capper-Volstead Act. And you can read about production restraints here.

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Noerr-Pennington immunity—named after two US Supreme Court cases—is a limited antitrust exemption for certain actions by groups or individuals when the intent of that activity is to influence government actions. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine can apply to actions that seek to influence legislative, executive, or judicial conduct. There is, however, an important sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity that often comes up in litigation.

You can learn more about the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and antitrust liability here.

Statutory and Non-Statutory Labor Exemptions. The statutory labor exemption allows labor unions to organize and bargain collectively in limited circumstances, including requirements that the union act in its legitimate self-interest and that it not combine with non-labor groups. The non-statutory labor exemption arrives from court decisions that further exempt certain activities that make collective bargaining possible, like joint action by employers that is ancillary to the collective bargaining process.

Implied Immunity. Implied immunity occurs in the rare instances in which there is no express antitrust exemption, but the anticompetitive conduct falls into an area of such intense federal regulatory scrutiny that antitrust enforcement must yield to the pervasive federal regulatory scheme.

The typical area where this comes up is with the federal securities laws, which is a good example of pervasive federal regulation. The US Supreme Court case to read for this antitrust exemption is Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, from 2007.

Keep in mind that courts do not easily find implied immunity of the antitrust laws—there must be a “clear repugnancy” or “clear incompatibility” between the antitrust laws and the federal regulatory regime. A broad interpretation of this immunity could create massive antitrust loopholes because even a regulator with a heavy hand on an industry may not consider anticompetitive conduct as part of its command and control. And regulation itself creates barriers to entry in a market that is more likely to lead to less competition.

Export Trade Exemptions. A little-known exemption involves export trade by associations of competitors. This antitrust exemption arises primarily from the Webb-Pomerene Act and the Export Trading Company Act. These FTC and DOJ guidelines provide more information about this antitrust exemption.

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2022 Developments in Antitrust and Distribution

February 6, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Author: Steven Cernak

In the antitrust world in 2022, stories about Big Tech, government enforcement, and merger challenges dominated the headlines. But in putting together the 2023 edition of Antitrust in Distribution and Franchising (available for purchase soon!), I found a number of less-famous opinions that US distributors and their counsel should know. Just like last year at this time, I thought it made sense to share some of the research highlights. Below, I summarize opinions on important topics like Robinson-Patman, vertical price agreements, and locked-in consumers.

Robinson-Patman

Robinson-Patman’s Depression-era prohibition of some price and promotion discrimination has not been enforced by the federal antitrust authorities for decades — although, as we discussed recently, that might change soon. Even as government enforcement disappeared, private enforcement continued — again, as we have discussed before. Courts dealing with those private suits have been stingy, sometimes even hostile, in their interpretations of the law — once again, as we have discussed very recently. Two 2022 opinions continued those trends.

In Dahl Automotive Onalaska Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (588 F.Supp. 3d 929, W.D. Wisc.), the defendant paid its dealers a portion of the MSRP of every vehicle sold so long as the dealer was building, or had built, a dealership exclusive to defendant’s brand. Plaintiffs were several small dealers who claimed the payments were harmful price or promotional allowance discrimination because other, larger, dealers sold more cars and so could recoup the cost of the exclusive dealership construction more quickly.

The court granted defendant’s Robinson Patman Act summary judgement motion. The court found that even if the payments allowed larger dealers to recover their construction costs more quickly, “it doesn’t mean that the payments result in price discrimination” because the promised payments merely allowed the dealers to recoup their cost of construction already incurred. Therefore, plaintiffs’ Section 2(a) claim failed. The court also found that the payments were not for “promotional allowances” because the dealership building did not resemble “advertising-related perks.” The court agreed with prior courts that had “concluded that buildings where sales occurred were not promotional facilities.” Therefore, plaintiffs’ Section 2(d) claim failed.

In In re Bookends & Beginnings LLC (2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152596, S.D.N.Y.), plaintiff independent booksellers claimed that major publishers and Amazon violated various laws, including Robinson-Patman Section 2(a), when the publishers granted Amazon a larger discount than it granted plaintiffs. The magistrate judge recommended granting defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim because the Morton Salt inference of competitive injury was inappropriate when the actual discount to Amazon was not known or alleged and there was no other factual support for the complaint’s “conclusory allegation” that the discount was “steep,” “huge,” or “substantial.

Vertical Price Agreements and Retailer Cartels

As we have discussed on the blog, the Leegin case changed the evaluation of vertical price agreements under federal antitrust law from per se illegality to a rule of reason analysis. But while the Court found that such agreements were not always anticompetitive, it did discuss some situations when they might be anticompetitive: For example, when “there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel.” The Court also expressed concern if the restraint were imposed by a manufacturer or retailer with market power.

In Davitashvilli, et. al. v. GrubHub Inc. (2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58974 S.D. N.Y.), purported classes of restaurant customers survived a motion to dismiss their claims that defendants, three of the most popular online platforms for meal deliveries, harmed competition through vertical price agreements. The three defendants require the restaurants whose meals they deliver to charge the same price to customers using defendants’ services as those customers dining in and/or using a competitive delivery service. Plaintiffs likened defendants to the retailers and the restaurants to the manufacturers in Leegin, a comparison the court found “somewhat strained” but “plausible.” Because of the alleged market power of each or all of the defendants, plaintiffs plausibly claimed that the restaurants were forced to work through defendants and raise their prices to the purported classes of diners to recoup some of their additional costs.

Market Power Over Locked-In Customers

In the Supreme Court’s classic tying case, Kodak, the defendant required purchasers of replacement parts for its copiers to also purchase copier service from it. Because defendant often was the only seller of those parts, plaintiffs claimed that defendant had market power sufficient to force customers to accept this tie. Defendant, and the Court’s dissent, argued that defendant could not have power in the aftermarket for parts for its copiers because it had no power in the foremarket for copiers. The Court’s majority responded that defendant could have market power over that subset of its customers who were “locked in” to defendant’s copiers, perhaps because they purchased a copier before defendant adopted its tying policy and because switching to a different copier was costly. As a result, defendant’s summary judgment motion in Kodak was denied.

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Antitrust for Kids: Lemonade Redux: Alternatives to Non-Competes In the Face of the FTC’s Proposed Ban

January 24, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Author: Molly Donovan

You might recall that Max and Margie are next-door neighbors on Lemon Lane.

In a strange turn of events, after Max was found liable for an illegal hub-and-spoke conspiracy against Margie, she let bygones be bygones and hired Max to procure materials for her lemonade stand and to develop new flavors of soft drinks for kids. In that role, Margie and Max agreed that, should Max ever leave Margie’s employ, he wouldn’t compete with Margie by working to sell any kids’ beverages within the city limits for a period of 2 years.

That was all fine until the FTC announced a proposed ban on non-competes, defining “non-compete clause” as a “contractual term between an employer and a worker that prevents the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person, or operating a business, after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer.” Substance is more important than form—so that if any agreement functions as a “non-compete,” under the FTC’s definition, it would be banned, too, regardless of its label.

Now Margie’s in a bind—does she undo her noncompete with Max? Does she try to language around the proposed ban? Does she wait to see if the ban comes to fruition? Certainly, due to their history, she doesn’t fully trust Max who she has trained at length (including in antitrust compliance), is privy to top-secret recipes, and has developed key relationships with Margie’s lemon suppliers, all in the course of his employment with Margie. Given all that, can’t he be stopped from competing against her in the event he works for another beverage company someday?

Here’s what Margie should know: the FTC has recognized two carve-outs to the potential ban—one for non-solicitation agreements and one for non-disclosures. Such agreements aren’t subject to the proposed ban because they don’t “prevent” workers from competing with their former employers. Instead, a non-solicitation would prevent workers only from soliciting clients or customers with whom the former employer has a business relationship. And non-disclosures would prevent workers only from using proprietary information learned during the course of employment in a new job.

If used as an alternative to a non-compete, these types of clauses should continue to be tailored to particular customers, products and geographic areas that are relevant to the employee at issue and the pertinent procompetitive justifications. An overly broad non-solicitation or non-disclosure could be said to function the same as a non-compete and therefore, become subject to the proposed ban.

Margie could consider other options as well. Perhaps a unilateral policy that deferred compensation or other incentive payments will be clawed back should a worker choose to compete, disclose confidential information in a new position, or disparage Margie in some way. Such a policy is not a contractual agreement because it’s unilateral, and it doesn’t prevent Max from competing—it merely discourages him. (Of course, Margie should be sure a clawback is legit under other laws like ERISA).

Further, if Margie is considering a stick, she might also consider a carrot: a unilateral incentive program for workers that don’t compete within a specified time period or a specific geographic region, etc.

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FTC’s Proposed Noncompete Ban Has Already Succeeded

January 19, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Author: Steven Cernak

Recently, the Federal Trade Commission proposed a nearly complete ban on noncompete provisions in employment agreements. Because it faces the usual lengthy rulemaking process and several expected legal challenges, the proposed rule might not become effective for months, if ever. Through the proposal and attendant publicity, however, the FTC already has drastically changed how such provisions will be used.

Noncompete Basics and the Law Today

Noncompetes prevent workers from leaving an employer to work for other employers, typically competitors. The clauses usually are limited in time and geography. So, for example, a worker is prohibited from working for specific other employers — say, competitors — in a particular geographic area — say, Michigan — for a limited period of time — say, six months after leaving the first employer. Through these clauses, employers hope to better protect their secrets and avoid training a worker for a competitor. For example, a nondisclosure agreement might not adequately prevent use of the first employer’s competitive details that are embedded in the worker’s brain.

Today, such provisions are usually evaluated under state common or statutory law. A handful of states ban them. A few statutorily limit their use to high salary workers. Most try to balance the interests of the employer with those of the worker trying to earn a living in a chosen field. Such provisions are more likely to be upheld if the interests of the employer are legitimate and the restrictions on the worker’s mobility are limited.

FTC Proposed Rule

On January 5, 2023, the FTC proposed a rule that would upend that status quo developed over hundreds of years, declaring nearly all noncompetes as an “unfair method of competition” under the FTC Act, and outlawing nearly all of them. The proposal would allow some noncompetes in the sale of a business and sought comment on partially exempting noncompetes for high salary workers. The proposal would prohibit parties from entering new noncompete provisions and employers from enforcing existing ones. Also, all state laws that were not as restrictive would be pre-empted. The FTC is seeking comment on the proposal through March 10.

Reaction was quick. The proposal at regulations.gov generated thousands of official comments, mostly positive, in the first couple weeks. Negative commentary in the media took several angles. First, some renewed arguments that the FTC does not have the authority to issue rules under its “unfair methods of competition authority.” Others questioned whether the FTC has the authority under recent Supreme Court precedent to answer, without explicit Congressional direction, such a “major question” that has generated thousands of opinions and state laws over hundreds of years.

Finally, even granting that the FTC has the authority for such a rule, some argued that the FTC’s 200+ page notice did not adequately support the wisdom of departing from the typical case-by-case evaluation because other analyses found the overall effect of such noncompetes to be mixed. The FTC will need to consider all the official comments and decide if any tweaks to the proposed rule are appropriates. Unless the rule drastically changes, legal challenges seem certain. Therefore, a ban on nearly all noncompete provisions might not be effective for many months, if ever.

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Antitrust Group Boycotts: My Competitors are Conspiring Against Me

January 14, 2023 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

Do you feel paranoid? Maybe everyone really is conspiring against you? If they are competitors with each other—that is, if they have a horizontal relationship—they may even be committing a per se antitrust violation.

A group boycott occurs when two or more persons or entities conspire to restrict the ability of someone to compete. This is sometimes called a concerted refusal to deal, which unlike a standard refusal to deal requires, not surprisingly, two or more people or entities. This antitrust claim fits into Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which requires a meeting of the minds, i.e an agreement or conspiracy.

A group boycott can create per se antitrust liability. But the per se rule is applied to group boycotts like it is applied to tying claims, which means only sometimes. By contrast, horizontal price-fixing, market allocation, and bid-rigging claims are almost always per se antitrust violations.

We receive a lot of questions about potential group boycott actions. This is probably the most frustrating type of antitrust conduct to experience as a victim. Companies often feel blocked from competing in their market. They might be the victim of marketplace bullying.

You can also read our Bona Law article on five questions you should ask about possible group boycotts.

Many antitrust violations, like price-fixing, tend to hurt a lot of people a little bit. A price-fixing scheme may increase prices ten percent, for example. Price-fixing victims feel the pain, but it is diffused pain among many. Typically either the government antitrust authorities or plaintiff class-action attorneys have the biggest incentive to pursue these claims.

Perpetrators of group-boycott activity, by contrast, usually direct their action toward one or very few victims. The harm is not diffused; it is concentrated. And it is often against a competitor that is just trying to establish itself in the market. The victim is often a company that seeks to disrupt the market, creating a threat to the established players. This is common. Of course, excluding or limiting competitors from a market may also create diffused harm among customers or sellers for those excluded competitors.

The defendants may act like bullies to try to keep that upstart competitor from gaining traction in the market. Sometimes trade associations lead the anticompetitive charge.

Group boycott activity often occurs when someone new enters a market with a different or better idea or way of doing business. The current competitors—who like things just the way they are—band together to use their joint power to keep the enterprising competitor from succeeding, i.e. stealing their customers and market share.

Sometimes group-boycott claims are further complicated when the established competitors—the bullies—use their relationships with government power to further suppress competition. Indeed, sometimes the competitors actually exercise governmental power.

This is what occurred in the NC Dental v. FTC case (discussed here, and here; our amicus brief is here): A group of dentists on the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners engaged in joint conduct, using their government power, to thwart teeth-whitening competition from non-dentists.

This, in my opinion, is the most disgusting of antitrust violations: a group of bullies engaging government power to knock out innovation and competition. And we, at least in the past, have watched the Federal Trade Commission take a pro-active role against such anticompetitive thuggery.

Group Boycotts and ESG

An increasingly prominent example of a group boycott that you should watch for are companies that coordinate their ESG policies such that they exclude competitors that decline to accept these rigid restrictions. You can see how this could develop: A group of companies in an industry decide that they want to win some PR points by announcing ESG policies, but quickly realize that this decision increases their own costs such that they can’t offer products or services that are of competitive quality and price with those in their industry that focus on the consumer. So they coordinate together and try to stop suppliers from dealing with this consumer-friendly company, or engage in other collective tactics to exclude this lower-priced competition. There is a good chance that these actions create antitrust liability for the coordinating ESG companies. And as the FTC recently reiterated, ESG does not create antitrust immunity.

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Does an Exclusive-Dealing Agreement Violate the Antitrust Laws?

December 29, 2022 | Bona Law PC

Author: Jarod Bona

Sometimes parties will enter a contract whereby one agrees to buy (or supply) all of its needs (or product) to the other. For example, a supplier and retailer might agree that only the supplier’s product will be sold in the retailer’s stores. This usually isn’t free as the supplier will offer something—better services, better prices, etc.—to obtain the exclusivity.

If you compete with the party that receives the benefit of the exclusive deal, this sort of contract may aggravate you. After all, you have a great product, you offer a competitive price, and you know that your service is better. Then why is the retailer only buying from your competitor? Shouldn’t you deserve at least a chance? Isn’t that what the antitrust and competition laws are for?

Maybe. But most exclusive-dealing agreements are both pro-competitive and legal under the antitrust laws. That doesn’t mean that you can’t ever bring an antitrust action under exclusive dealing and it doesn’t mean you won’t win. But, percentage-wise, most exclusive-dealing arrangements don’t implicate the antitrust laws and are uncontroversial.

You can read our article about exclusive dealing at the Bona Law website here.

It is important that I deflate your expectations a little bit at the beginning like this because if you are on the outside looking in at an exclusive-dealing agreement, you are probably angry and you may feel helpless. From your perspective, it will certainly seem like an antitrust violation. And your gut feeling about certain conduct is a good first filter about whether you have an antitrust claim. What I am trying to tell you is that with regard to exclusive dealing, your gut may offer some false positives.

Of course, the market is full of exclusive or partial-exclusive dealing agreements and there are relatively few of these that turn into federal antitrust litigation. So if you see an exclusive-dealing claim in federal litigation, it may be one of the rare instances of an exclusive-dealing antitrust violation. Clients and prospective clients often contact Bona Law about exclusive-dealing agreements that are antitrust violations or close to antitrust violations. And we counsel clients on their own exclusive-dealing agreements. But people don’t call us for most varieties of exclusive dealing, which are perfectly legal under the antitrust laws.

So what is an exclusive dealing agreement?

An exclusive dealing agreement occurs when a seller agrees to sell all or most of its output of a product or service exclusively to a particular buyer. It can also happen in the reverse situation: when a buyer agrees to purchase all or most of its requirements from a particular seller. Importantly, although the term used in the doctrine is “exclusive” dealing, the agreement need not be literally exclusive. Courts will often apply exclusive dealing to partial or de facto exclusive dealing agreements, where the contract involves a substantial portion of the other party’s output or requirements. And if there are only two competitors in a market, for example, the exclusive-dealing agreement may take the form of the more powerful of the two competitors telling customers that if they want the powerful company’s products or services, they can’t also purchase from the other competitor.

You should also understand that loyalty-discount agreements and exclusive dealing agreements are, under the law, sometimes indistinguishable.

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