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Author: Jarod Bona

It is illegal under the antitrust laws for competitors to agree not to steal each others’ employees. For more about that, you can read our article about how the antitrust laws encourage stealing. Yes, you read that correctly.

But this article isn’t about stealing or even agreeing not to steal employees. Instead, it is about one of our favorite topics: Suing the government under the antitrust laws and the increasingly narrow state-action immunity from antitrust liability.

The FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division can affect antitrust policy beyond just the cases that involve those agencies. They will often file amicus briefs, or in this case, a Statement of Interest of the United States of America. You can read here about how these type of filings have resulted in the FTC seeming like a libertarian government agency.

In Danielle Seaman v. Duke University, a class action alleging that Duke and the University of North Carolina had a no-poaching agreement in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest on March 7, 2019.

One of Duke’s arguments in defense of the lawsuit is that it is exempt from antitrust liability because it is a state entity. This is called state-action immunity. We write about this doctrine constantly at The Antitrust Attorney Blog.

Anyway, Duke argued that it is Ipso facto exempt from the antitrust laws because it is a “sovereign representative of the state” that is automatically exempt under the Parker doctrine (which is essentially the state-action immunity doctrine). Notably, this argument is flawed already, as the doctrine really only supports automatic exemption for the state acting directly as sovereign, which is typically limited to the state acting in its legislative capacity, or its Supreme Court acting as a legislator (which sometimes happens).

But the Department of Justice, in addition, argued that state-action immunity—or at least Ipso facto immunity—does not apply because Duke University is acting as a market participant, not as a regulator. The DOJ supported this argument with some familiar case law, including the landmark NC Dental case.

It seems that the DOJ market-participant argument is limited here to the point that Duke cannot be automatically exempt from antitrust liability because it is a market participant rather than a regulator, for purposes of the anticompetitive conduct.

But the same reasoning that DOJ makes and the same cases that DOJ cites support a broader market-participant exception to state-action immunity overall. This is an issue that the US Supreme Court expressly left open in its Phoebe Putney decision.

It is a short step from the argument that DOJ makes here to a straightforward market-participant exception to state-action immunity.

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Authors: Magdalena Jakubicz and Luis Blanquez

Magdalena Jakubicz is a Sr. Corporate Counsel at Cisco where she helps her business clients to achieve their goals while ensuring antitrust compliance across EMEAR and Latin America. Magdalena’s day-to-day responsibilities include the following: designing and delivering compliance programs; co-leading commercial litigations and responses to government inquiries; assisting with merger control fillings; and advising on vertical agreements and matters related to abuse of dominant position. Magdalena also provides legal support to the Cisco Brand Protection team, where she advises on parallel imports and counterfeiting. Finally, Magdalena provides advice on general commercial law matters. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of Cisco or any affiliate companies.

Companies often run selective distribution systems to preserve their brand image. To achieve this, for example, they may prohibit their distributors from reselling their products through third party online platforms such as Amazon or eBay. While this sort of ban may protect brands, it isn’t popular among competition authorities across the European Union (“EU”) countries.

This has been a hot topic in the EU for quite some time now, especially following the publication of Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, Case C-230/16.

What is the Coty Case?

Before Coty, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) had already ruled that a general ban on Internet sales in the context of a selective distribution system was a so-called “hardcore” restriction (restrictions and business practices that are particularly harmful to competition) and did not comply with Article 101.1 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFUE”).

This case, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence and Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, Case C-439/09, involved certain cosmetics and hygiene products, manufactured by Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmetique and sold mainly through pharmacists.

Pierre Fabre required that its products be sold exclusively through brick and mortar shops and in the presence of a qualified pharmacist. Pierre Fabre argued that the restriction was necessary to maintain the quality of the products. The ECJ disagreed and ruled that “the aim of maintaining a prestigious image is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition.” This case confirmed that companies may want to avoid contractual clauses that prohibit general sales over the Internet.

In Coty, which involved a company that sells luxury cosmetic products in Germany, distributors were not authorized to resell the goods through third party on-line platforms. The General Court (“GC”) held that such a prohibition may be justified provided certain conditions are met. In the GC’s view, the preservation of the company’s “luxury image” is, in fact, a valid criterion. In particular, the GC held that a ban on sales over a particular online platform does not constitute a hardcore restriction under EU competition law. The judgment caused some sensation as—although a general ban on any sales over Internet would still be contrary to the EU competition law—a ban on sales over particular online platforms may be allowed under Coty.

But, what practical implications has Coty had on businesses with a multinational footprint?

Companies that do business in Europe should consider the following implications of Coty:

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Author: Jarod Bona

This website is called The Antitrust Attorney Blog, not the Appellate Attorney Blog. But I have combined an appellate practice with my antitrust practice my entire legal career and we do a lot of appellate work at Bona Law. So sometimes we address appellate, writing, and briefing issues here.

I previously wrote about why you should hire an appellate lawyer.

And mused about what is great legal writing.

Here is an article about the details of how to actually prepare for and write a significant appellate or antitrust brief.

In this article, I discuss the three foundations for every argument on appeal. These can also apply to trial-level arguments, but at the appellate level you can usually build a more complete argument, so I will use the appellate brief as the model.

Of course, what I like about antitrust is that the cases tend to be more complex, which usually invites deeper arguments, even at the trial level (similar to an appellate brief).

My arguments incorporate these three components.

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Author: Luis Blanquez

Antitrust and competition law is a global issue. Markets that could be national are often global instead (because if they aren’t naturally local, there usually isn’t reason to stop at a country’s borders).

Bona Law embraces this international reality. That is part of what attracted me to the firm upon my arrival in the United States after 15 years of practicing antitrust and competition law in Europe. We can help clients all over the world with US and EU antitrust issues.

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The FTC Headquarters in Washington, DC. The cornerstone to the building was laid in 1937 by Franklin Roosevelt, reportedly using the same trowel George Washington used to lay the cornership of the U.S. Capital in 1793. In the spirit of competition, the National Gallery of Art has set its sights on expanding into the FTC building, and in 2016, the General Services Adminsitration has been investigating the proposal. The FTC has strongly resisted this form of competition for its space.

Author: Steven Levitsky

Under US antitrust Law, parties to certain mergers and acquisitions must prepare what is called a Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) filing for the antitrust agencies.

In an earlier article, we mentioned that HSR filings, at least for voting securities and LLC interests, are not triggered by the literal “size-of-transaction” amount.

Instead, they are triggered by a combination of (1) all existing holdings in a target plus (2) what you intend to buy in that target. (In HSR lingo, this is called “aggregation.”) Plus, you need to calculate the total existing holdings across the entire control group. (In HSR lingo, this means all the entities controlled by the “ultimate parent entity.”) When you don’t, you run the risk of being fined $40,654 per day.

Here’s a great example, based on a real-life case. Alpha Fund owns $84 million of Bravo Ltd’s voting securities. Alpha Fund is controlled by Mr. Smith. Because of this control, Mr. Smith is the hedge fund’s “ultimate parent entity,” and he is deemed to “hold” everything in his control group.

Based on his fund’s holdings, Mr. Smith was appointed to the Board of Bravo Ltd. As a board member, he was given stock options for 10,000 voting shares and exercised them. Let’s assume that those shares were worth $50 each, so that the entire option acquisition was only $500,000. This is 0.0059% of the HSR threshold of $84.4 million. But that’s not the way the HSR system works.

What Mr. Smith should have done (or rather, what his lawyers should have done) was combine, or “aggregate,” all his existing holdings ($84,000,000) with the options he was about to convert $500,000). In other words, as a result of his option transaction, Mr. Smith now “held” $85,000,000 of voting securities in Bravo Ltd. But he never made an HSR filing. In this case, the FTC fined him $250,000.

This is actually a simplified version of the real story. In fact, Alpha Fund had previously failed to make an mandatory HSR filing, and had made a corrective filing only later, only proving that it is hard to keep track of acquisitions across a control group. As part of the settlement of the corrective (after-the fact) filing, the FTC always imposes an obligation to create and maintain a compliance program for future acquisitions. The FTC takes the position that a second failure to file proves that the compliance program was not complied with.

By the way, there was absolutely no competitive issue involved in this violation. The control group’s collective holdings in Bravo Ltd. were too low for it to be able to exert any control. Furthermore, Bravo Ltd. granted the options with one single day to exercise them. There was no possibility for Mr. Smith to have made an HSR filing. Despite all these mitigating factors, the fine was imposed simply because there had been an acquisition that required an HSR filing, and no filing was made.

Here’s another complication from the same story. Let’s assume that Alpha Fund bought the shares at $50,000,000, and that over time they appreciated in value to $84,000,000. It’s not clear, but it seems possible that Alpha and Mr. Smith had considered the original acquisition cost of the stock ($50,000,000 plus $500,000). That was another serious mistake, because the HSR rules require you to calculate the current value of your existing holdings. In other words, if your original $50,000,000 investment grows to $85,000,000 through appreciation, you don’t need to do a thing. But you can’t acquire a single dollar more of stock in the same target without making a filing.

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Aspen Mountains

Author: Jarod Bona

Yes, in certain narrow circumstances, refusing to do business with a competitor violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which regulates monopolies, attempts at monopoly, and exclusionary conduct.

This probably seems odd—don’t businesses have the freedom to decide whether to do business with someone, especially when that person competes with them? When you walk into a store and see a sign that says, “We have the right to refuse service to anyone,” should you call your friendly antitrust lawyer?

The general rule is, in fact, that antitrust law does NOT prohibit a business from refusing to deal with its competitor. But the refusal-to-deal doctrine is real and can create antitrust liability.

So when do you have to do business with your competitor?

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Sculpture Man Controlling Trade

This 1942 sculpture by Michael Lantz, 17-feet long, is meant to suggest a heroic figure (the FTC) restraining violent and untamed American commerce.

Author: Steven Levitsky

If you liked the old computer game, “Minesweeper,” then you’re ready to take on Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) filings for antitrust review of mergers & acquisitions. Both have rules. And both can produce unexpected catastrophes even if you think you’re following the rules. In fact, major clients, advised by major law firms, have been hit with hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines for mistakes that no one thought of at the time.

Let’s start with the 50,000 foot view of HSR compliance. You might know the basics: (a) you need to make an HSR filing when one side of the transaction has sales or assets of at least $16.9 million; (b) the other side has sales or assets of at least $168.8 million; (c) the transaction size is greater than $84.4 million; and (d) no exemptions apply. (These are 2018 figures).

An example to consider

Here’s an example of how things can work out badly. Let’s assume you get a call from the CEO of your client, Alpha Co. Alpha Co. is a small and relatively new company and the CEO tells you:

  1. Alpha’s annual sales and assets are $15 million.
  2. Alpha plans to buy $80 million of the voting securities of Bravo Ltd. (Alpha’s borrowing $65 million to do the deal.)
  3. Based on this, he wants to know if they need to make an HSR filing.

Applying what you know, you conclude that the “size-of-person” and “size-of-transaction” tests are both not met, so no HSR filing is required. Alpha Co. goes ahead and closes the deal.

Three months later, your client hears from the FTC. The FTC tells them that they violated the HSR Act by not filing, and that the fine is $41,484 per day, or $3,733,560 in all. What went wrong? (We’ll explain in detail in Point 2.)

But generally, what went wrong is that the 50,000 foot view is not enough. HSR rules are extremely technical and, some would say, not exactly logical. A lot of HSR terms don’t have a common sense meaning. You need to check and cross-reference the definitions and rules. And these, by the way, are not organized in any friendly or rational way, but seem to read like the Tax Code.

Here are some basic HSR concepts that might help you avoid the worst minefields.

  1. What are the basic HSR tests?

There are two tests to see if a filing is required.

First, “size-of-person.” Normally, you don’t need to file for the antitrust enforcers unless one side of the deal has sales or assets of at least $16.9 million and the other side has sales or assets of at least $168.8 million. (This are 2018 figures; these numbers change every February.)

But, as we’ll see soon in Point 2, the size-of-person test does not mean the size of the transaction party. Instead, it means the size of the buyer’s entire business group, or everything under the control of its highest entity (see §5). Don’t fall into the trap of measuring an incomplete control group.

Second, the “size-of-transaction” must be over $84.4 million (again, this is 2018; the numbers change every February). But there are several other filing thresholds that cover more purchases in the same target and could require successive filings. These include $168.8 million; $843.9 million; 25% of the target — but only if the size-of-transaction is more than $1.688 million; and 50% of the target — or control. Once you get control, you can buy as much more of the target as you want without ever filing again.

But, as we’ll see soon in Point 2, the “size-of-transaction” does not really mean the size of the transaction. Instead, it means (1) the combination of existing holdings and planned acquisitions, (2) that the entire buyer control group will have in the target control group after the deal closes (see §2). This includes voting stock acquired years before, that has to be analyzed at its current value. Don’t fall into the trap of measuring the wrong amount.

  1. What is an “ultimate parent entity” and why does it matter?

The “ultimate parent entity” is the top controlling entity of an entire business group.

The “ultimate parent entity” matters to your antitrust filing for the following reason. The purpose of the HSR filing system is to let the antitrust agencies know of significant shifts in competitive power. As a result, they don’t care about the names on the contract, which may be only small subs or special purpose vehicles. The antitrust agencies want to know what is really happening in terms of changes of competitive power.

To give the agencies that information, you must identify the entire control group of your transaction party. You do this by tracing control upwards from the transaction party (Alpha Co., in our case) to the very highest control level of the business group. That entity at the top, that isn’t controlled by anyone else, is the “ultimate parent entity,” which can be a company or an individual. The “ultimate parent entity” makes the filing. Its collective size and holdings affect the “size-of-person” and “size-of-transaction” tests we discussed in Point 1.

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European-Union-Online-RPM-300x225Author: Luis Blanquez

On July 24, 2018, the European Commission fined manufacturers Asus, Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer for over €111 million for restricting the ability of online retailers to set their own retail prices for a variety of widely-used consumer electronics products.

Background

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Author: Jarod Bona

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed on July 17, 2018 to stay the FTC’s Action against the Louisiana Real Estate Appraisers Board.

The Fifth Circuit’s one-line decision rejects the FTC’s opposition to the Board’s requested stay and allows immediate appellate review of the FTC’s significant state-action-immunity rejection.

You might recall that we wrote about the FTC’s state-action-immunity decision the day it occurred, concluding that then Commissioner Ohlhuasen’s opinion was well-reasoned and thorough.

You can review the documents in the FTC administrative action against the appraisal board here.

This FTC administrative action arises out of allegations that a Louisiana board of appraisers required appraisal management companies to pay appraisers what it described as a “customary and reasonable” fee for real estate appraisal services. The FTC argues that this is illegal price-fixing, which, of course, violates Section 5 of the FTC Act.

What is particularly interesting about this case is that it addresses one of the most significant applications of the active supervision prong of the state-action-immunity doctrine since the US Supreme Court decided NC Dental.

You might recall that, in most cases, entities that want to claim state-action immunity must satisfy both prongs of the Midcal test: (1) the challenged restraint must be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; and (2) the policy must be actively supervised by the state itself.

You can read our analysis of active supervision and related FTC guidance on the requirement here.

As we described in our prior article, Commissioner Ohlhausen effectively addressed important factual and legal issues that make up the active-supervision standard, offering useful guidance to boards and those that challenge them under the antitrust laws.

For example, the FTC applied three elements that it held—in this case—form part of active supervision: (1) the development of an adequate factual record; (2) a written decision on the merits; and (3) a specific assessment of how the private action compares with the substantive standard from the legislature.

While the Fifth Circuit’s stay decision is not good news for the FTC’s current action, it may be good news for state boards and others that want guidance on the active-supervision requirements of state-action immunity.

The Supreme Court’s NC Dental decision offered some parameters of what doesn’t constitute active supervision, mostly from prior cases. But at this point, the law is light on the specifics. A federal appellate decision that fully engages on these issues will help state boards, victims of state boards, district courts, and, in fact, the Federal Trade Commission.

Besides the substantive active supervision issue, this case presents the drama of the Louisiana governor trying to get around the state-supervision deficiencies through executive order in response to the FTC’s initial antitrust complaint. The board argued that the executive order made the FTC’s case moot. The FTC, of course, rejected that argument.

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Author: Robert Everett Johnson, The Institute for Justice

Robert Everett Johnson litigates cases protecting private property, economic liberty, and freedom of speech. He is also a nationally-recognized expert on civil forfeiture. Bona Law has a strong relationship with The Institute for Justice, going back to Jarod Bona’s clerkship with the group after his first year of law school. We highly recommend that you check out the wonderful work they do for freedom and liberty.

You may have heard: The First Amendment has been weaponized.

Justice Kagan said so in Janus v. State, County and Municipal Employees, where her dissent accused the majority of “weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.” Justice Breyer agreed, dissenting in NIFLA v. Becerra and complaining that (contrary to the majority opinion) “professionals” should not “have a right to use the Constitution as a weapon.” And the New York Times took up the cry, publishing a front-page Sunday article titled “How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment.”

All of this sounds frightening, but the truth is more reassuring. Courts are doing what they are supposed to do: As the amount of economic regulation has increased, it has inevitably restricted freedom of speech, and now courts are restoring the balance. Lawyers should embrace this newly vibrant First Amendment, and should ask themselves how it can serve the interests of their clients.

Rights Are—And Should Be—Weapons

The truth is, the First Amendment has always been a weapon. After all, that’s exactly what constitutional rights are—weapons to be used against the government. When critics say the First Amendment has been “weaponized,” all they really mean is it is being enforced.

The First Amendment has been used, time and time again, as a weapon to resist government power. When the NAACP invoked the First Amendment to protect their right to solicit clients for civil rights litigation, they used the First Amendment as a weapon. When unions invoked the First Amendment to protect the right to picket their employers, they used the First Amendment as a weapon. And when students invoked the First Amendment to protect their right to protest the Vietnam War, they also used the First Amendment as a weapon.

What is the alternative to a “weaponized” First Amendment? We could retire the First Amendment from active service and hang it on the wall like a soldier’s antique gun. We could continue to protect speech with little real-world impact—protests at funerals and animal crush videos come to mind—while exempting speech that threatens the status quo. That kind of neutered First Amendment would be a shiny object to admire, but it would not secure freedom of speech in any meaningful sense. Fortunately, the First Amendment is more than a shiny object on the wall.

Economically-Motivated Speech Is Still Speech

While the First Amendment has always been a weapon, something has changed in recent years. When people say the First Amendment has been “weaponized,” they really mean it has been applied to uphold free speech rights in the context of economic regulation. But that is as it should be: Speech does not become any less valuable because it is associated with economic activity.

There is no question that the Supreme Court is increasingly willing to uphold First Amendment claims that arise in the economic context. This Term, Janus upheld the right of employees not to contribute money to a public union, and NIFLA rejected the argument that speech receives less protection because it is uttered by a “professional.” Other recent cases have applied the First Amendment to regulations of credit card pricing schemes, as well as restrictions on the sale of drug prescription information. There is no reason to think any of that will change with the nomination of Judge Kavanaugh to the US Supreme Court, as he has previously applied the First Amendment to regulations of internet service providers.

This is a good thing. As Justice Kennedy put it, writing in 1993 in Edenfield v. Fane: “The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.” Indeed, speech in the commercial marketplace often touches on some of the most important facets of human life: Doctors speak to patients about matters of life and death; financial professionals speak to clients about their financial security; and even your local grocer can convey information critical to your health. The importance of these subjects only makes the free flow of information all the more vital to a free society.

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