Author: Luis Blanquez
Summer is over and everyone is back at the office. If you’ve been enjoying some days off, you’ve probably missed what happened recently in the algorithmic-pricing space in the US. And, as always, we had a very busy summer here.
- First, there is a new case from the Northern District of California that confirms the importance of not only the nature of the information shared with the software provider, but also whether such information is later incorporated into any final pricing recommendations.
- Second, we have the first opinion from a Court of Appeals—in this case the Ninth Circuit in the Gibson v. Cendyn Group case—analyzing an antitrust claim involving algorithmic pricing.
- And third, the DOJ Antitrust Division announced its recent settlement with Greystar Management Services to resolve the DOJ’s claims about the use by Greystar of RealPage’s software.
As I said, everyone has been working hard around here during the past months!
This first article explains the Dai v. SAS Inst. Inc new case. Also, if you need some background on the current cases before diving into the new developments, we’ve written several articles on algorithmic pricing:
- The FTC has Algorithmic Price-Fixing in its Antitrust Crosshairs
- New Antitrust Cases and Statements of Interests About Algorithmic Collusion
- Quick Update on Algorithmic Pricing: Yardi and the “Per Se” Standard
Dai v. SAS Inst. Inc., No. 24-CV-02537-JSW (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2025)
In this new case, plaintiffs sued software provider IDeaS, Inc. (“IDeaS”), and a group of hotel operators including Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., Hilton Domestic Operating Company Inc., Four Seasons Hotels Limited, Omni Hotels Management Corporation, and Hyatt Corporation, for conspiring to fix hotel room prices (“Hotel Operators”).
Here are the allegations:
IDeaS is the dominant provider of revenue management and profit optimization software and services for Hotel Operators.
According to the complaint, Hotel Operators agreed to provide IDeaS with non-public, competitively sensitive price and occupancy information in real time, including the price paid by consumers for each room, the quantity of rooms available by room type, whether or not any consumers attempted to book a room that was no longer available, and room rates not visible to the public.
IDeaS would then plug all the information into its algorithm, generating supra-competitive pricing recommendations for each of them.
And the last—but certainly not least—piece of the puzzle: each defendant would implement IDeaS’s supracompetitive pricing, because they know all their horizontal competitors are doing the same thing.
Plaintiffs did not rely on direct evidence but rather alleged the inference of a horizontal agreement by the group of Hotel Operators using IDeaS’s software. They argued parallel conduct—when Hotel Operators began to use IDeaS’s software and to charge allegedly supra-competitive rates based on IDeaS’s recommendations—together with (i) an invitation to collude as well as the motive and the opportunity to do so; (ii) high barriers to enter the relevant market; (iii) inelastic demand for hotel rooms; and (iv) sharing of confidential information against self-interest; all as plus factors to show antitrust conspiracy.
Would this be enough to show the existence of an antitrust conspiracy? Not quite, according to the Northern District of California.
Remember, Sherman Act Section 1 antitrust cases require: (1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy among at least two different entities; (2) an intent to restrain trade; and (3) injury to competition. See here and here.
On July 18, 2025, the District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint on several grounds. What is particularly helpful for future litigants in this Opinion is the comparison the Court makes with past recent cases.
The Court in California held here that plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege parallel conduct for several reasons.
First, the Opinion compares the current case to In re RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litig., 709 F. Supp. 3d 478 (M.D. Tenn. 2023), where a critical level of RealPage’s software adoption explaining how defendants changed their strategy and increased prices—despite not acting simultaneously—was enough to show parallel conduct.
Then, and in contrast, it mentions Gibson v. MGM Resorts Int’l, No. 2:23-cv 00140-MMD-DJA, (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2023), where a court dismissed the complaint for lack of parallel conduct. In that case, plaintiffs neither include information about when the defendants began to use the software and which systems they used, nor alleged facts about the rate at which the defendants accepted the software recommendations. Plaintiffs did include general allegations of the acceptance rate for the price recommendations, but that was not sufficient to make the existence of an agreement plausible according to Twombly requirements.
Last, the Northern District of California states that plaintiffs did not provide enough facts in this case to explain when the Hotel Operators began to outsource their pricing decisions to IDeaS; when they started to change their strategy and increased prices; or when and how they started to adopt IDeaS’s pricing recommendations to their room prices.
In other words, according to the Court, plaintiffs did not have to show that each defendant acted at the exact same moment in time or acceptance rate. But plaintiffs did have to plead additional facts to render the allegations of parallel conduct plausible, which as explained below, they didn’t do.
Indeed, the Court reasoned that plaintiffs did not allege enough plus factors: