Articles Posted in Antitrust Counseling

Articles about antitrust counseling and training.

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Author: Steven J. Cernak

As I prepare again to teach an antitrust survey course, part of the preparation involves rereading some of the classic foundational U.S. antitrust cases.  Many of them make some sweeping statements about how the Sherman Act embodies a national policy to order our entire economy through competition.  “The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition” comes from Standard Oil in 1911.  The Court went even further in 1958 in Northern Pacific Railway:

The Sherman Act … rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.

Twenty years later in Professional Engineers, the Court described an argument that asserted competition might be unethical as “nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”

Were such broad statements true then?  Do they remain true now?  Is the Sherman Act “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” as the Court asserted in Topco in 1972?  After all, we have had exemptions, both legislative and court-made, for decades.  But even beyond those official exceptions, there are plenty more examples of our frequent desire for experts, not the competitive process, to supersede market outcomes.

One personal anecdote helps illustrate the point.  I have been involved in the ABA Antitrust Law Section for decades.  The ABA, like any good trade association of competitors, has its own counsel to ensure that it does not run afoul of the antitrust laws.  Years ago, however, when my day job was in-house antitrust lawyer at General Motors and my ABA assignment involved antitrust aspects of trade associations, I was asked by the Section to lead a compliance presentation for another ABA group consisting of several law school admission deans.

Our presentation started with the antitrust basics for trade associations:  The antitrust laws want to preserve competition among competitors, Sherman Act Section 1 is suspicious of agreements among competitors, trade associations are gatherings of competitors where such agreements can be reached, and law schools compete with each other in various ways, including to attract students.

After about fifteen minutes, one of the deans raised his hand and posed this hypothetical:  Some students change schools between first and second year.  Such transfers are not good for the student – usually, any issues leading to a transfer go beyond a particular school and the student should try to get help with any underlying concerns.  But the transfers also hurt the law schools – after all, we have spent considerable time, effort, and money to make that student one of ours and transfers destroy that investment.  So, could this ABA group make it unethical for law schools to solicit, or even accept, most transfer students?

My fellow presenters were taken aback and silent for a few seconds.  Had this dean not been listening when we had said a few minutes earlier that agreements not to compete among competing members of a trade association were antitrust violations?  Finally, I broke the silence.  I did a facepalm and said “D’oh!  What a great idea!  Why didn’t we think of that?  We could have gone to Toyota thirty years ago and said ‘you know, we spent considerable time, effort, and money to make those current Chevy owners ours and you selling to them will just destroy that investment.  How about we agree that you will only market to folks who have never purchased a car?’”

It took a few seconds but then the lightbulbs went off over the heads of the audience:  Yes, the competitive processes for legal education might be a little different than those for motor vehicles, but that competition still exists and antitrust law is designed to protect it.  Any agreements to short-circuit that process by having experts at the competitor-suppliers determine the customer’s best interest would be at least suspect.  My GM clients would have understood that my Toyota hypothetical was an antitrust problem.  Why didn’t this law school dean?

Was it because the deans saw themselves as “professionals” and so in some way exempt from the need to compete?  Perhaps, although the Court made clear in Professional Engineers that any hint of an antitrust exemption for professionals that some saw in Goldfarb was incorrect.  Professionals might compete in different ways but the antitrust laws still protect that competition to yield the best results for customers.

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Author: Aaron Gott and Nick McNamara

As the effects of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic continue to ripple across all sectors of the economy, agriculture has been hit especially hard. The widespread closure of restaurants combined with the general hit on most Americans’ wallets has precipitated a massive demand shock, which in turn has sent the prices of agricultural products such as corn, soybeans, milk, and fresh produce tumbling. While this may be good news for consumers (at least in the short run), it does not bode so well for farmers, who in recent months have had to resort to dumping milk and culling herds of livestock—practices which are both wasteful and potentially environmentally harmful.

Can farmers work together to mitigate these issues by agreeing, prior to production, to set production caps so that prices may be stabilized, and waste avoided? The answer depends on whether such controls on output are covered by the Capper-Volstead Act’s antitrust exemption for farm cooperatives.

Under normal circumstances, a concerted agreement among horizontal competitors to restrict output is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. But the Capper-Volstead Act, enacted in 1922 amid populist fervor in the agricultural sector, provides a limited antitrust exemption to “[p]ersons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers.”

You can read a more detailed primer on the Capper-Volstead Act here. But, in brief, the act allows agricultural producers to collectively process, prepare, handle, and market their products. Now, it is important to note again that the exemption applies only to agricultural producers, not processors. This past year, there has been a flurry of antitrust litigation against pork and beef processors who are alleged to have agreed to restrict output, among other things. As discussed in the primer, the Supreme Court has held that a cooperative cannot include processors because they do not fit into the category of “farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers.” Thus, only those entities at the most basic level of the food supply chain get to enjoy the exemption.

For producers, the farm cooperative exemption has been interpreted by courts to include a blanket exemption from antitrust liability for price fixing, a practice which also normally incurs per se liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. No court has ever directly ruled on the question of whether the exemption applies also to output controls, but there are indications they might find output restrictions outside the narrow confines of the act.

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Author: Steven Cernak

So you have been invited to your first trade association meeting.  Sounds like fun, right?  You get a chance to mix and mingle with others in your industry, maybe swap notes with your counterparts at competitors who face the same pressures you do.  What could go wrong?

A lot, from an antitrust perspective.  While trade associations can provide tremendous benefits to members, by definition, they are meetings among competitors.  Communication with competitors can lead to “agreements,” whether explicit handshakes or implicit winks and nods.  And some of those agreements, like most related to competitive pricing, are automatically illegal and subject to severe penalties for both you and the company.  Here, antitrust law follows Adam Smith’s admonition that

People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.

So even if you remember your company’s training from when you joined years ago and know enough to spell “antitrust” without a hyphen, you still need to remember these tips.

Learn from others in your company

You might not be the first in your company to attend an association meeting.  Contact your lawyer or boss to see if your company has rules or other guidance for attending them.  Follow that guidance.  Some companies even require such reporting before attending.  Others in your company might know this particular association and have some suggestions on how to make your attendance both safe and productive for you and your company.

Antitrust policy?

If you need to vet the association, start by asking to see its antitrust policy.  All associations of competitors should have one and should be willing and able to share it with you quickly.  Most post it online.  The policy should acknowledge the necessity to follow all applicable antitrust laws and briefly describe how the association does just that.  Frankly, the details are not as important as the fact that the association has one and can quickly provide it.  An association executive who responds to your request with “Anti what?” should set off alarm bells.

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Contrary to the belief of many of today’s businesspeople, antitrust law’s coverage of distribution did not start with Amazon or even the Internet.  For decades, manufacturers have sold their products to resellers of all types to increase the distribution of their products.  Manufacturers always have been interested in how their products, often with their brands, are resold.  They often have tried to dictate or influence the pricing and marketing tactics of their resellers.

Since 1890, US federal antitrust law has been there every step of the way, drawing the line between permissible and impermissible restraints.  The 2020 edition of Cernak’s Antitrust in Distribution and Franchising summarizes where those lines are today.

In just over one hundred pages, the book provides concise, plain English coverage of all the antitrust topics manufacturers and retailers—and their representatives—need to understand.  Businesspeople can quickly get up to speed on potential distribution options.  Libraries can provide their users, especially students, an efficient way to start their research.  Generalist lawyers can review summaries of the key principles and cases necessary to assist their clients.

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Author: Jon Cieslak

When a law enforcement or regulatory agency—such as the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—investigates potentially illegal business conduct, it may not be targeting just the company under investigation. Oftentimes, authorities are also targeting the company’s employees who engaged in the illegal conduct, and corporate officers and other employees are frequently indicted alongside their employers in antitrust and other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2014). Indeed, in 2015, U.S. Attorney General Sally Yates issued the so-called “Yates Memo” that reaffirmed DOJ’s commitment to seek “accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”

While the company typically hires outside counsel with experience defending the potential claims, one area that is sometimes overlooked is whether the employees involved in the investigation need their own lawyers. Employees may think the company’s lawyer represents them as well, but that is rarely the case and employees should be quickly disabused of the notion. Both the Supreme Court in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), and legal ethics rules compel corporate lawyers to clarify when they do not represent individual employees when conducting internal investigations. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(f).

So when does an employee need her own lawyer?

While there is no bright-line rule, considering some key questions can help you make the right decision.

First, is the employee a target of the investigation, or merely a witness? During an investigation, investigators will talk to many potential witnesses in addition to the individuals whom they suspect of illegal conduct. When confident that investigators believe an employee is only a witness to the potentially illegal conduct, the need for separate counsel is significantly reduced.

Second, does the employee face personal consequences as a result of her conduct? Consequences may include criminal penalties such as imprisonment or fines, suspension or loss of professional licenses, personal liability for civil damages awards, or employment consequences such as demotion or termination. While even a small chance of criminal penalties merits separate counsel, as the likelihood of any of these consequences grows, so too does the importance for an employee to have her own lawyer. Keep in mind, too, that individuals involved in some illegal conduct—such as an antitrust conspiracy—can be jointly and severally liable for all the harm caused by the conspiracy, so could face an enormous civil damages award even if their role was minimal. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981).

Third, was the investigation initiated by a law enforcement or regulatory agency, or is it purely an internal investigation by the company itself? In general, separate counsel is less important in internal investigations. On the other hand, when the government is investigating, separate counsel can benefit both the employee and the company. Not only will the employee’s interests be better protected, separate counsel will also help insulate the company’s lawyers from potential disqualification and allegations of obstruction. Separate counsel is particularly important when an employee will be interviewed directly by law enforcement agents, who are more likely to trust a witness’s independent attorney.

Fourth, and most importantly, does the employee have any actual or potential conflicts of interest with the company and, if so, how severe are they? When both the company and the employee are targets of a government investigation, there will almost always be at least a potential conflict between them. A company usually has substantial incentives to cooperate with a government investigation, such as the potential for amnesty under the DOJ’s Leniency Program and credit for cooperating under the Sentencing Guidelines. To fully cooperate, however, the Yates Memo requires companies to “completely disclose . . . all relevant facts about individual misconduct.” Meanwhile, an employee involved in the conduct may want to seek immunity in exchange for testifying against the company or other individuals. Even less severe conflicts, however, can warrant separate counsel. If an employee disagrees with the company’s view of the facts or feels pressure to testify in a certain way, separate counsel may be needed to protect the employee’s interests.

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Author: Steven Cernak

On March 24, 2020, the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division issued a joint statement regarding their approach to coordination among competitors during the current health crisis. The agencies announced a streamlining of the usual lengthy Advisory Opinion or Business Review Letter processes for potentially problematic joint efforts of competitors. The statement also confirmed that the antitrust laws had not been suspended and, for instance, price fixing would still be prosecuted.

More importantly, however, the agencies reminded businesses that many kinds of joint ventures of competitors have long been allowed, even encouraged, under the antitrust laws. That message might have been lost in the blizzard of reports and client alerts focusing on the changes to the processes to judge only the riskiest joint efforts. Especially in economic crises, businesses should consider if certain joint ventures with others in their industry, including competitors, might be good for both the businesses and their customers. As explained below, the U.S. auto industry has been using such joint ventures for decades.

Joint Ventures

The term “joint venture” can cover any collaborative activity where separate firms pool resources to advance some common objective.  When that joint activity among competitors is likely to lead to faster introduction of a new product, lower costs, or some other benefits to be passed on to customers, antitrust law will balance those benefits with any loss of competition.  Two specific types of joint ventures—research & development and production—have received particular antitrust encouragement. Below, lessons from both types are explored using examples from the auto industry.

Research & Development Joint Ventures

The FTC and DOJ have described joint R&D as “efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity” and, generally, pro-competitive. Getting scientists and engineers from competing firms to share data, test results, and best practices on basic areas that each company can then build on to create or improve competitive products can save money and reduce time to market.

GM, Ford and then-Chrysler started doing joint R&D on battery technology and other basic building blocks of motor vehicles in 1990. In 1992, all these efforts were put under the umbrella of the United States Council for Automotive Research or USCAR.  Through USCAR and other joint efforts, these fierce competitors cooperate on technologies like advanced powertrains, manufacturing and materials, and various types of energy storage and then compete on their applications in their vehicles.

Similarly, GM and Ford shared design responsibilities for advanced 9- and 10-speed transmissions. After the cooperating on design, each company then manufactured the transmissions and competed on the vehicles that used them.

Production Joint Ventures

In 1983, GM and Toyota formed a production-only joint venture, NUMMI, to produce vehicles for each parent that were then marketed separately. In 1984, the FTC barely approved the joint venture and insisted on an Order imposing reporting requirements and limits on communication.  By 1993, the FTC had grown comfortable with NUMMI’s operation and so unanimously voted to vacate the Order as no longer necessary given changed conditions.

NUMMI’s success in navigating through antitrust concerns led to other production joint ventures in the industry including a Ford-Mazda one for vehicles, a Chrysler-Mitsubishi-Hyundai joint venture on engines, and a GM-Chrysler joint venture on manual transmissions. None of them were as controversial or received the same level of antitrust scrutiny as NUMMI.

The National Cooperative Research and Production Act

At about that same time as NUMMI’s formation, Congress was clarifying the antitrust laws to ensure that certain cooperative efforts that could benefit consumers were not inappropriately stifled by the antitrust laws. In 1984, the National Cooperative Research Act confirmed that most R&D joint ventures would be judged under the rule of reason. To further encourage such pro-competitive cooperation, the law also allowed the parties to file a very short notice describing the joint venture with the FTC and DOJ. Once such a notice is published in the Federal Register, any antitrust liability for the joint venture and its parents is limited to actual, not treble, damages and attorney fees. In 1993, the law was expanded to cover certain joint production ventures and standard development organizations and retitled the National Cooperative Research and Production Act or NCRPA.

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Author: Steven Cernak

Like many crisis situations, the Coronavirus Pandemic has created concerns and even outcry about price gouging for certain products.

If your company manufactures one of these products and your dealers and retailers have suddenly jacked up prices for them, what can you do?

Real Estate

Author: Jarod Bona

I am an antitrust attorney and CEO of a growing business, but my wife loves real estate and we have been investors over the years. You may have seen our real-estate investing website. So when antitrust and real-estate issues combine, I pay close attention. Not surprisingly, we receive a lot of calls about antitrust violations or issues in the real-estate industry. In fact, the Department of Justice and FTC have recently been studying antitrust/real-estate issues.

Antitrust law is especially relevant to real-estate professionals like brokers and salespeople because (1) competitor brokers both compete and cooperate on a daily basis; (2) prices and commission splits are often announced and well-known; (3) there is a history of tension and battles between a traditional business model and new business models (this can create antitrust litigation in any market); (4) associations and cooperative Multiple-Listing Services (MLS) play large roles in the industry; (5) US antitrust enforcers, like the Department of Justice and FTC, have seriously scrutinized the real-estate industry.

Here are five antitrust issues that real-estate professionals should understand:  Continue reading →

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Author: Steven Cernak

When I first started practicing antitrust law in the “80’s, the Robinson-Patman Act was already an object of derision.¹ With Chicago School thinking riding high in academia and the courts and antitrust law’s focus shifting to effects on consumers, not rivals, RP cases seemed to be dwindling down to nothing. My colleagues and I were convinced that RP would soon be dead and we would never again need to deal with its tortured language² and questionable economics.

But not all my colleagues. One insisted that Robinson-Patman would never be repealed—after all, what member of Congress would vote against protecting small business?—and the private right of action would mean that the threat of litigation would always at least affect negotiations even if the federal agencies stopped bring new cases.³  Despite our constant ridicule of his outdated ways, he insisted that I learn the intricacies of the statute and cases, analyze the latest changes to the Fred Meyer Guides, and otherwise prepare to take over from him the counseling of a client that sold goods “of like grade and quality” in at least three overlapping channels.

I’m glad he did. He was right. To this day, suppliers and retailers negotiate in the shadow of RP and require counseling about its sometimes-obscure details. Every year, new private litigation gets filed and generates opinions and even jury verdicts on Robinson-Patman issues.⁴  Fewer than in the “60’s but still greater than zero.  So for all the suppliers and the retailers through whom they sell—along with their respective counselors—here is a summary of what you need to know about RP in the 21st Century:

The Basics of the Robinson-Patman Act

There are two kinds of discrimination that RP is meant to prevent and where some litigation is still filed today. Section 2(a) prohibits the sale of the same commodity at different prices to two competing buyers by one seller if the result is harm to competition. It has several elements that must be met and potential defenses, all of which narrow the scope of its application. Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are per se prohibitions of the discriminatory provision of or payment for certain promotional aids meant to assist in resale of a seller’s commodity. Again, several elements must be met to prove a violation. In addition, Robinson-Patman applies only to commodities sold for use or resale in the U.S.

Section 2(a) Price Discrimination – Elements

The elements of a Section 2(a) claim are usually summarized as prohibiting (1) a difference in price (2) in reasonably contemporaneous sales to two buyers purchasing from a single seller, (3) involving commodities, (4) of like grade and quality (5) that may injure competition.

While price discrimination is “merely a price difference”, actual net prices must be compared, after taking into account all discounts, rebates and other factors affecting price. If the lower price is “functionally available” to the plaintiff but plaintiff chooses not to accept it, courts have held that such proof “essentially negates the discrimination element” of plaintiff’s price discrimination claim.⁵

The two sales at different prices must be reasonably contemporaneous, a question of fact that depends on the seasonal quality of the sales and overall market conditions. Also, those two contemporaneous transactions must be “sales”, not something else like leases, licenses or an offer to sell. Finally, two completed sales are required and so at least one court has held that this element is not met in competitive bid situations where the commodity is only purchased if the dealer’s bid is successful.⁶

Section 2(a), as well as sections 2(d) and 2(e), apply only to “commodities”, a term left undefined by the statute. Courts have consistently interpreted the term to mean tangible products. Intangible items that have been held not to be commodities include medical services, cable television programming, and advertising, including online advertising.

The two commodities sold at different prices must be “of like grade and quality” for Section 2(a) to apply. When interpreting that statutory language, lower courts have followed the US Supreme Court’s lead in FTC v. Borden Co. and focused on physical differences in the products that affect consumer marketability. In that case, the Court found two varieties of the defendant’s evaporated milk to be “of like grade and quality” because the products were physically identical, even though the higher-price branded version had gained consumer preference over the lower-priced private label version.⁸

The final element of a Section 2(a) violation is whether “the effect of such discrimination may be substantially … to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly …”, which has been interpreted to mean that a plaintiff need not show an actual adverse effect on competition, only a “reasonable possibility” of such an effect.

Injury to competition generally is found at the level of a rival to the discriminating seller (“primary line injury”) or of the disfavored customer (“secondary line injury”). The Supreme Court’s Brooke Group opinion clarified that a successful primary line claim must meet the same difficult test required of predatory pricing plaintiffs.⁹ As a result, secondary line cases now predominate.

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Author: Steven Cernak

While I was the in-house antitrust lawyer for General Motors, outside counsel on several occasions suggested to me that GM should “institute a Colgate program” or “a minimum advertised price (MAP) program.”  I am confident that all those lawyers could have helped build a fine Colgate program or other method that would restrict how GM dealers and distributors priced and marketed GM products – but the suggestion was still wrong for a few reasons.

First, it vastly overestimated the control that I or any other lawyer had over GM pricing decisions.  More importantly, it assumed that the suggested restraint was right for that GM product at that time, an unsafe assumption given the wide variety of products and services that GM sells in different regulatory and competitive environments.  Before suggesting a tool to use, the attorney should have helped me determine if it was right for GM’s business situation.

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